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Richard Stanton
This book is prefaced with the engaging assurance
(pp. viii-ix)' that it is meant to be "tentative,
hypothetical, exploratory", and that criticism,
"even attack", is welcomed; after which any
reviewerincluding this onewould wish to err
on the side of charity. All the same, I think it
important to say harsh things about the book-
to make an example of it. This is partly because
it shows us empiricism foraging on relatively un-
familiar terrain, and so may help illuminate the
habits of that beast. But, more important, it offers
a vital negative lesson about how to approach
the study of consciousness in a development
context.
The authors address themselves to the following
question: If 'modernity' is taken as comprising a
certain roughly determinate set of institutions,
what are the elements of consciousness which,
because they have to go with those institutions,
will always have to form part of modernity?
Their view of institutions is, as they readily
acknowledge, a standard one, with Weber to the
fore: "technological production" and bureaucracy
are quintessential, arising in any societycapita-
list or socialistwhich is undergoing moderniza-
tion. Secondary institutional features include
urbanization, means of mass communication, and
so forth. The account of modernity's subjective
side has only a little more novelty to it.
Rationality, abstraction, impersonality, future-
orientation, all appear in various guises. But their
claim is not to have made discoveries about
either the objective or the subjective features of
modernized society. What they are concerned with
is the link between.objective and subjective. This
occupies their all-important part I. In the course
of it they develop the theme of 'pluralization of
life-worlds'. Life within modern society, they
suggest, gets split up into multiple spheres, each
of which encloses a particular way of thinking
as well as a particular kind of activity. Con-
sequences are a preoccupation with life-planning,
2 P. P. Berger and T. Luckmann, The Social Construction of
1 Page numbers throughout refer to the Random House edition. Reality, Allen Lane, Penguin Press, London, 1967.
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and equally a constant sense of being a mere
migrantthat is, homeless.
In part 11 the authors endeavour to apply their
scheme of analysis to Third World experience.
They move out from their central themeresults
in consciousness of the emergence of modern
institutionsto consider also the converse rela-
tionship: adaptation of institutions to cater for the
'discontents' that will animate populations whose
consciousness is being 'modernized'. The rise of
state bureaucracies and of Third World forms of
socialism is discussed in these terms. They survey
ways in which modernization has been confron-
ted by ideology, distinguishing between ideologies
which endorse modernity; those which demand
its subjection to specified non-modern values; and
those which reject it altogether. This leads to the
scrutiny, in part III, of an instance of the latter
'demodernising' impulse, the contemporary
'counter-culture' in the USA and Western Europe.
The authors have a lot of fun showing how it
has been animated by the futile aspiration to
liquidate patterns of consciousness that go with
modernity. Their concluding plea is for a recog-
nition that any attempt to re-order either mind
or social system will have to respect the limits
they set for one another.
The book has sharply luminous moments:
remarks on the unprecedented security of bour-
geois childhood, for example (pp. 191-194);
discussion of the difference between modern and
non-modern temporality (pp. 148-151). There is
courage in it, the uncommon courage to make
a frontal approach to the question: how will the
objective social order yield its day to day working
consequences in consciousness, understood as a
whole? In such respects it is reminiscent of the
famous 'Berger-and-Luckmann'2, a work which
several years ago fostered in many of us an
initial enthusiasm for the sociology of knowledge,
and which remains one of the few pieces of
required reading on the subject.
By and large, however, the present book is
profoundly unsatisfactory. Its failings are diverse,
but if I am not mistaken they compose a co-
herent story.
Categorism
As one reads, a series of puzzles builds up. How
do BB & K come to write at length about
'technological production' and bureaucracy with-
out offering any definition of either? Why the
resounding and recurrent banality? Whence the
fondness for the tautology as means of expression?
(My favourite example is their definition of
'mechanisticity': "This means that the work pro»
cess has a machinelike functionality so that the
actions of the individual worker are tied in as an
intrinsic part of a machine process", (p.26)). 1f
they could not dispense with tautology, which
admittedly has an elemental strength and ele-
gance, might they not have spared us the
proliferation of terms (a large portion of the part
I conceptual apparatus) that are just plain re-
dundant? And why the inconsistency in the use
of their own terms? Every author is entitled to
hag somewhat at intervals, but faults of authorship
on this scale demand specific explanation.
in my view, they can only be symptoms of
the malady caregorisin. This is the tendency
to suppose that thinking up a category within
which to fit a phenomenon is the same as
understanding the phenomenon. It has perhaps
an affinity with the old scholastic doctrine of
nominalism, that the reality of a thing resides in
its name. It is endemic to empiricist social science
(we thus establish where BB & K, for all their
references to Teutonic theorists, actually belong).
Indeed, if empiricism be defined by the dictum
"Think of a category and p.ut some facts under
it", then clearly categorism is one of its two
essential tendencies, apparently contradictory but
really complementary. For the empiricist, there is
on the one hand 'empirical work', our old friend
the accumulation of observable facts; and on the
other hand, 'theorizing', which means slapping
down another category once every few pages,
i.e. categorism. (Not that the latter activity is
unrelated to any theory; only the relationship is
oblique and highly mediatedsee below). The
lackadaisical character of BB & K's argument is
after all not so puzzling. It is natural tht
pleonasm, inanity and a cheery indifference to
real-world denotation should hold sway, when
to speak bluntlyplaying with categories is the
name of the game.
Myopia
When BB & K suppose that the modern indivi-
dual has "plentiful experience" of dealing with
bureaucracy (p. 43), indeed normally feels
'encircled' by it (p. 60); not only knows his
biography to be 'open', a 'migration through
different social worlds', but even glories in this
fact (p. 77); typically relies on the family as his
'life-planning workshop' (p. 72); enjoys "enor-
mous latitude in fabricating his own particular
private life" but tends to get "furiously frustrated"
by his inability to make a good job of it (pp. 186-
187), it becomes clear that their universal
modernity is actually the projection of the life
and times of a successful liberal professional in
the advanced West.
More than mere ethnocentricity is in question,
though there is some of that: if modernity
typically means a 'privatization' expressing itself
in the primacy of the family, what are we to
make, for instance, of the findings of K. M.
Kapadia and S. D. Pillai3, that the response to
'anonymity' in an Indian industrial township was
the strengthening of joint family and caste, not of
nuclear families? There is also parochiality of
time. Having chosen, for instance, to rest
their analysis so heavily on what young people
around them were doin,g and saying in the late
l960s, BB & K oblige the 1975 reader to point
out that Western youth is already to a consider-
able extent 'into' different things. Still more
serious is the social parochiality. How many car-
workers or textile operatives, even in the most
thoroughly 'modernized' economies, really travel
through 'different social worlds' in the course of
their livesor, if they have to, really revel in
doing so?4 As to the notion that 'modern' people
suffer 'enormous latitude in constructing their
lives, let us not dwell upon it. The authors have
strained to see modern subjective life in depth;
but their vision proves to be short-range.
A corresponding myopia bedevils their attempts
to analyse social change in concrete instances,
actual or possible. They would have us believe
that the primary reason why 'upwardly mobile
young people' in African countries look to
government bureaucracy for employment rather
than to industry, is that the former is better able
than the latter "to accommodate itself to tradi-
tional patterns of social relations" and therefore
(sic) promises more "status, privilege and power"
(p. 127). They offer a scenario (pp. 220-222) for
a possible crisis in rich Western countries: lower
classes adopt current middle-class child-rearing
practices; their progeny consequently start
drifting off to the communes as well; people begin
to fear that modern institutions will be left desti-
tute of personnel; in order to protect their way of
3 Industrialization and Rural Society, Popular Prakashan,
Bombay, 1972, pp. 31 and 187-188.
4 Cf. J. Goldthorpe et la, The Affluent Worker, CUP,Cambridge, 1969.
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life, the non-drop-outs (united mothers and
fathers?) resort to 'highly coercive' counter-
measures . . . A momenfs reflection on the way
these countries have actually got into trouble iii
the past four years will put into relief the fairy-
tale quality of such prognosis.
3. Non-location
Their major institutional, extra-subjective pheno-
menatechnological production, bureaucracy,
pluralization of life-worlds'---are given no loca-
tion: neither vis-à-vis each other, nor in a
complete social order, nor with respect to history.
Though technological production and bureaucracy
"empirically ....have often operated in conjunc-
tion, they may also operate separately" (p. 103).
The authors reckon that bureaucracy's presence in
a particular social sector can be "arbitrary" (p. 42);
that it can have more or less "autonomy" (p. 107);
that sometimes it will be a lesser determinant
than productive activity, sometimes a greater
(p. 131). Technological production and bureau-
cracy, in their account, bob up and down
alongside one another like a pair of toy ducks
in the bathwater of social process. The concept
of "life-world" is introduced with a string of
instances (pp. 65-66) from public versus private
worlds, to the world of the medical clinic, to
the intrusive world of an interfering neighbour.
But they say nothing about how in general this
differentiation happens historically, nor even
about the criteria by which one life-world is
distinguished from another. Of particular concern
is the failure to locate 'technological production'
in history: failure to define it, to relate it to
earlier forms of manufacturing activity, to differ-
entiate between possible current forms.
'Modernity' itself, the entire nexus, floats un-
located in the same way as its institutional
components. lt appears as a discrete phenomenon
like inflation or racism. Thus, the world-view
which 'it' comprises has a dynamic of its own
(p. 40); 'it' can be credited with the accomplish-
ment of "many far-reaching transformations"
(p. 185): on the other hand, 'it' can only go so
far before running up against necessary limits
(p. 229). But unlike inflation or racism whose
rise or decline is subject to explanation, their
'modernity' is self-contained. Facts of the modern
period do nothing to explain it, because it
subsumes them all; nor do facts from earlier
epochs, for BB & K are silent on the matter of
its genesis. Carefully though they inscribe in
their introduction the principle that "modern
society . . . . is a historical entity" (p. 8), the
arrival of 'modernity' in history is left a mystery.
* * * *
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It will be clear by now what all this adds up to.
BB & K are candid about having no 'comprehen-
sive theory' of social life (pp. 10, 100, 101). The
preceding catalogue of faults measures the cost
of trying to get by with categorism, instead of
that theory.
But of course there is no such thing as a com-
pletely atheoretical book. When theory is missing
from the explicit argument, we can be sure that
it has simply withdrawn itself to some more
elementary level of composition. Thence as ul-
terior theory it promotes categorism in its
characteristic oblique fashion: licensing and
requiring a categorist approach, but ex hypothesi
never articulating itself in the categories con-
sequently thrown up. What is BE & K's ulterior
theory? I detect two main aspects.
(j) The individual is inflated to become chief
agent in social history. People occur in the plural
only as many individuals summated. For example,
BB & K have nothing to say about social rela-
tions in industry except that these involve
anonymity (experienced by individuals); and
indeed, their fundamental part I is almost entirely
devoid of reference to social groups or social
conflict.
(ii) Consciousness (of individuals) is what counts.
In BB & K's overt postulates it is but one among
several terms in a relationship; in their ulterior
theory it is constantly assuming supremacy. Ex-
planation of social development has its real locus
in the mental world. "Loss of integrative
meanings" is " the essential ordeal of moderniza-
tion" (p. 158); and a (subjective) sense of
'homelessness' is the price of the transformations
wrought by modernity (p. 195). Consider also
the outstandingly foolish passage (p. 130) where
they assert that in East African countries . .
"uhuru has enjoyed considerably greater popularity
among the masses than kazi (work) has", and
proceed to attribute this 'fact' to a "failure . .
of imagination".
The book's central purpose is to suggest possible
links between objective an subjective, their
pattern and their strength. How successful have
BB & K been in this endeavour? Not very. Ob-
viously enough the inadequacies listed above will
have impaired their analysis of linkage. But if
the ulterior and only effective, theory is the one
specified, its success will be an impossibility.
Study of the social determination of knowledge
is not reconcilable with such a theory.
Two examples. (a) They discuss the way in which
workers in an African mining centre gradually
"identify with modernity", distinguishing es-
pecially between migrant and settled labour
(p. 122); the process is treated as one of learning,
of increasing 'understanding', with length of
'exposure' the key variable. They miss entirely
the vital difference of objective interest between
the migrant and the settled worker. For the
former, modernity means low wages, low skills
and temporary employment, so that he has good
reason not to identify with it; vice versa for the
latter5.
(b) They use Duvignaud's study6 of Shebika, a
Tunisian village, as evidence for the pure power-
of-communication thesis: the course of a com-
munity's development can be influenced by a flow
of ideas in and of itself, "even if nothing else
changes" (p. 141, their emphasis). Duvignaud
found in Shebika an intense communal concern
about the village's decay, interrelated with high
expectation focused upon the government and
modernity, quasi-mythical benefactors alone
capable of restoring prosperity. On BB & K's
reading, what generated this crucial pattern of
consciousness in a village "virtually untouched
by the technological, economic and political
agents of modernization" was the influx of in-
formation and propaganda via mass media,
school and travellers' reports (pp. 141-142).
Let us allow the authors their peculiar premise
that the national radio service, the army whence
young villagers have returned, and the village
school, somehow fail to count as 'agents of
modernization'. Carefully documented by Duvig-
naud, however, is a series of circumstances
integral to the explanation of the Shebika pattern
of consciousness, such as: a dominant sense of
'degradation' resulting from rapid alienation of
village land to outsiders; an excessive man-land
ratio; growing pressure from Bedouin neigh-
bours; involvement in the national struggle against
the French up to independence; the occasional
experience of lucrative temporary employment on
government road building work7. These circum-
stances BB & K have chosen to disregard in
favour of 'flows of information'.
Conclusion
We learn from this book a lesson of capital
importance: analysis of the links between con-
sciousness and society has to be set within a
Arrighi, pp. 23-239, 1970.
6 Duvignaud, 1970.
7 Duvignaud, op. cit., pp. 26-27, 29, 81-83,152.
theory of social development as a whole,
adequacy of the former depending on adequacy
of the latter. It might be said with little exaggera-
tion that in the errors and vacuity of BB & K's
book we witness the defeat of the sociology of
knowledge as specialist enquiry. At any rate,
their failure puts in doubt the very common
supposition that study of consciousness and its
determination is somehow in antithesis to study
of the social structure. It prompts the realization
that in effective work on consciousness, the
social order and its dynamic would move out of
vision but, on the contrary, more sharply into
focus.
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